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 BEYOND TEXTUALISM: WHY ORIGINALIST THEORY 
MUST APPLY GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERPRETATION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN* 
The relationship between textualism and originalism is a cen-
tral issue in constitutional interpretation. That connection runs 
across the full range of issues that deal with institutional struc-
ture and individual rights—the two central concerns of consti-
tutional law. It is possible, of course, to steep oneself in the vast 
literature developed by judges and scholars of all political per-
suasions. But to do that, I think, is to engage in a deadly form 
of provincialism that treats the question of interpretation as 
though it were somehow distinctive to the field of constitution-
al law. That hasty conclusion is misguided because rules of in-
terpretation are necessary to deal with any spoken statement or 
written document. There is, in my view, no distinctive set of 
tools of interpretation that are, or should be, used in constitu-
tional law, and only constitutional law. As I have argued at 
length in my recent book The Classical Liberal Constitution: The 
Uncertain Quest for Limited Government,1 the best way to avoid 
the dangers of inbred discourse is to expand horizons to look at 
other areas of law, both ancient and modern, that face the diffi-
cult task of fleshing out an entire institutional design from a 
small particular text. In this short Essay, it is only possible to 
develop a brief account of these connections, which are orga-
nized around three rubrics—circumvention, justification, and 
remedial choice—all of which offer precise analogues between 
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Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, The Uni-
versity of Chicago. This Essay is a much revised version of the remarks that I gave 
to the panel on textualism at the annual Federalist Society National Lawyers Con-
vention in Washington, D.C., on November 14, 2013. My thanks to Matthew Hol-
breich, New York University School of Law, Class of 2015, for his helpful work on 
an earlier draft of this article. 
 1. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN 
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the public and the private law. I begin in an odd place, which is 
the development of the Roman law of delict—a cross between 
tort and crime—that is set out in the lex Aquilia found in Book 
IX, Title 2 of Justinian’s Institutes.2 Thereafter, I look in succes-
sion to issues of circumvention, justification, and remedy as 
they appear in both private and public law. All of these tech-
niques are, I think, strictly required by any comprehensive sys-
tem of textual interpretation, whether it deals with contracts, 
statutes, or constitutions. The purpose of this discussion is to 
explain why the use of these techniques is consistent with some 
broader originalist conception of interpretation which treats 
textualism as one, but only one, constituent part of the larger 
interpretive enterprise both within and outside constitutional 
law. I then conclude with a short discussion of how the disci-
plined use of these techniques makes no appeal to any notion 
of a living constitution, but indeed stands as a mode of inter-
pretation that exposes the defects of that approach. 
I. THE ROMAN CONNECTION 
The most important influence on my own views on interpre-
tation comes from what most people would regard as an eccen-
tric or outlandish subject: the Roman law, whose interpretive 
methods are best revealed in the lex Aquilia, which has two key 
sentences.3 The first states, “If anyone kills unlawfully a slave 
of either sex belonging to another or a four-footed animal of the 
kind called pecudes, let him be ordered to pay the owner what-
ever was the highest value of the victim in that year,”4 and 
thereafter, “In respect of all other things, besides slaves or cat-
tle [pecudes] killed, if anyone does damage to another by 
wrongfully burning, breaking or breaking off, whatever the 
matter in issue shall turn out to be worth in the next thirty 
days, so much let him be condemned to pay to the owner.”5 
                                                                                                        
 2. For a brief explication of the point, see BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO ROMAN LAW 207–11 (1962). 
 3. See generally Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional In-
terpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 699, 705–12 (1992). 
 4. DIG. 9.2.2 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Provinciale) in NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW 
81 (F.H. Lawson trans. 1950). 
 5. Id. at 9.2.27.5 (Ulpiun, Ad Edictum 18). I ignore here all the issues of interpo-
lation, except to mention that “In respect of all other things, besides slaves or cat-
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The hard work here begins with the explication of the text, 
which contains its fair set of surprises, none of which admit to an 
easy solution. To be sure, the Lex contains a discussion of what 
kinds of animals count as pecudes,6 which gives rise to questions 
of inclusion and exclusion, which usually can reach a definitive 
answer. But other problems are more intractable, including the 
issues of circumvention, justification, and remedy, to which I 
shall turn in due course. The first of these deals with the issues 
surrounding the verb “to kill.” The second deals with the word 
“iniuria,” and the third with the issues of remedy, of which the 
damages included in the lex Aquilia are variations. 
Constitutional law raises these kinds of questions, and an-
other one that was not discussed much in the Lex, which asks 
about the kinds of remedies for threatened harms, or damnum 
infectum, that were dealt with in other Roman texts on the sub-
ject.7 That question too arises in American constitutional law, 
when it is asked whether the claimant of a particular constitu-
tional right may enjoin the government from acting, or must 
content himself with receiving compensation for any loss that 
the government receives. 
So the process runs as follows: a basic text starts with a single 
well-crafted sentence, and ends up with a code of tort law that 
represents a coherent body of doctrine that transcends the as-
semblage of cases that are used to illustrate the basic principle. 
Our Constitution contains many terse texts that present just 
these interpretive problems, which the Framers thought would 
receive explication by the same techniques that had long been 
established. The connection between ancient law and the Con-
stitution is not one of mere coincidence. It is not just that key 
terms, like a republican form of government8 and “senate”9 are 
taken right out of Roman law. That is not mere coincidence be-
                                                                                                        
tle killed” is probably interpolated by the preparers of the Digest. See NEGLIGENCE 
IN THE CIVIL LAW at 8–11. 
 6. Id. at 9.2.2 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Provinciale 7). 
 7. For a discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Common Law Liability for Fire: A Con-
ceptual, Historical, and Economic Analysis in WILDFIRE POLICY: LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS PERSPECTIVES 3 (Karen M. Bradshaw & Dean Lueck eds. 2012). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them 
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when 
the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.”). 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
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cause the drafters of the Constitution were steeped in Roman 
law,10 as well as English legal history, including its Glorious 
Revolution and the adoption of its Bill of Rights in 1689.11 They 
understood the way in which text interacted with background 
principles, because that was exactly the way in which the anal-
ysis was done with the classical legal texts with which they 
were familiar. Many of the Founders were steeped in classical 
tradition, and when they started to do interpretation, they 
wrote statutes and constitutional provisions that looked very 
much like the ones that had existed earlier on. And, they ex-
pected that the same tools of interpretation would be used with 
respect to the Constitution. James Madison, for example, had 
excelled in Latin and Hebrew.12 
II. CIRCUMVENTION OF TEXTUAL COMMAND 
Now, what are these tools for successful textual interpreta-
tion? The first one is that you actually do have to read the text, 
closely and carefully, with an eye for nuance and detail. Thus, 
within the Roman system, the basic prima facie case is the kill-
ing of a slave or herd animal. The next question is what it 
means to kill, in Latin, by cutting or striking. There are, of 
course, nice points of clarification that one can kill not only 
with bare hands but with spears and other tools, which do not 
fit snugly into the Roman expression of harms “corpore cor-
pori,” or by the body to the body.13 But these actions do involve 
the direct application of force, so that they are treated in Ro-
man texts just as actions for trespass in the English and Ameri-
can law. But it is always a mistake to equate trespass with tort; 
these trespass cases do not exhaust the basic inquiry. Thus, 
within short order the Latin text consciously shifts gears to ask 
what should be done in those cases where the defendant has 
not killed the slave or animal, but has only “furnishe[d] a cause 
of death”—for example, supplied poison that the slave then 
drank to his own demise14—for which there is again no explicit 
                                                                                                        
 10. See, e.g., NEAL RIEMER, JAMES MADISON: CREATING THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION 18–19, 24 (1986). 
 11. Id. at 25. 
 12. RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 56 (1971). 
 13. See NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW, supra note 4, at 14. 
 14. DIG. 9.2.7.6 (Ulpian, Ad Legem Aquiliam). 
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textual warrant but only the strong power of analogy. Does the 
law want to create a royal road to evasion by allowing these 
activities to take place? The answer is again no. At this point, 
the law has two tiers of remedy, one for the direct and the other 
for the indirect harms. That feature is not dependent on either 
Latin grammar or Roman culture. The distinction between ac-
tions in trespass and actions on the case raises exactly the same 
set of issues in Anglo-American law.15 
Similar issues work themselves into the fabric of American 
constitutional law. What is meant by the term “speech” or 
“search or seizure” could be determined with an eye toward 
both their core meaning and the natural extensions that each 
term has. Thus, with speech it would be idle to deny that a per-
son who speaks on a pedestal on Hyde Park Corner is speaking 
just because he is gesticulating as well. To take the position that 
only “pure” speech is protected is to engage not in constitu-
tional law, or indeed any form of interpretation. It is to engage 
in the exercise of arbitrary power. And if the gesticulations are 
protected with the speech, so too is a performance in mime, 
even though not a single word is uttered. It takes little imagina-
tion to offer the same protection to dance or to art, which are 
part of the communications enterprise, sometimes with a polit-
ical message and sometimes not. But it is hard to think of any 
coherent theory that offers protection to speech that declines to 
offer it to the substitute modes of communication that are an 
integral part of ordinary social interactions. 
At this particular point, it is necessary to inject a modicum of 
game theory into our constitutional interpretation to explain 
why the principle of circumvention plays such a key role in all 
interpretive systems. The initial assumption is that the constitu-
tional texts are not just inserted to adorn a parchment monu-
ment to the aspirations of mankind. They are there as safeguards 
against those persons who are in power.16 Therefore, it should be 
taken as a large risk that those persons who are entrusted with 
power will work on at least some occasions to engage in the fine 
art of circumvention to escape direct prohibitions against them. 
                                                                                                        
 15. See, e.g., Scott v. Shepherd, (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B.). 
 16. See, e.g., Senator Michael S. Lee, Opening Address at the Federalist Society 
2013 National Lawyers Convention (Nov. 20, 2013). 
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Sticking too close to the literal meaning of the text lets them 
achieve their private objectives at public expense. 
It is in light of this fear that the above examples lead to a 
principled translation in understanding. A quick peek at the 
titles of the various books and articles that address freedom of 
speech reveal this simple point. They do not talk about speech 
as such, but use in its stead an expanded term “expression” 
that brings in all the analogous cases referred to above, even 
though semantically speech and expression are not the same 
terms.17 One obvious challenge to this linguistic transformation 
is that it represents a lawless extension of constitutional power 
by substituting a broad term for analysis where a narrow term 
is used in the text. But if the method of analogies and compari-
sons has any value, this charge turns out to be baseless. Indeed, 
if the question could be put to the drafters of the First Amend-
ment, it is clear that they would embrace the broader meaning, 
even if they had not addressed that specific issue at the time of 
the initial drafting. The point applies both to behaviors that 
were known at the time (dancing) and to those that were not 
(broadcasting). The advent of new ways of doing something is 
not something that no one anticipates. It is incorporated into 
the very fabric of the language. 
The same attitudinal approach applies to the kinds of gov-
ernment regulation that are directed toward the broad class of 
expression. The key term here is “abridge,” which on its face 
does not seem to cover the case where the speech or other form 
of expression is totally suppressed. But, again, the risk of cir-
cumvention is too great, so that the protection of freedom of 
speech does not only apply to direct prohibitions, but to the 
full range of taxes, fines, and regulations that could be directed 
toward speech broadly defined. It will not do to combat the 
direct forms of government abuse if these indirect means are 
allowed to proceed without oversight, for otherwise the Consti-
tution will be reduced to a parchment barrier.18 The same pro-
cess of expansion found in the Roman lex Aquilia carries over to 
the Constitution. 
                                                                                                        
 17. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3 (1970). 
 18. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison). 
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III. GOVERNMENT POLICE POWER JUSTIFICATIONS 
There is then ample reason to think that the basic coverage of 
any fundamental structural provision has to extend beyond the 
particular cases that gave birth to the notion. But if the system 
of analogical extension broadens the scope of the constitutional 
provision, there arises a second set of issues that can be derived 
from private law texts—the set of justifications for conduct that 
constitutes a prima facie wrong. Again, it is useful to look at 
the Roman examples as to how this technique has been used in 
practice. Once the lex Aquilia is finished with the textualist ex-
plication of the term “pecudes,” it veers off into a discussion of 
possible justifications for inflicting harm on others, in order to 
explicate one of the trickiest terms in the Latin (and for the 
same reason, also in the English) language: “iniuria,” which 
can be translated as either “unlawful” or “wrongful.” 
It is something of a puzzle, perhaps, why the topic of justifi-
cations should be taken up before the prima facie case is itself 
established, and it would be a mistake to think that this de-
pends on some deep philosophical understanding of tort liabil-
ity that requires more traditional analysis of the topic. But in 
fact the key to this issue cannot be solved by translation, for it 
depends exclusively on the word order in the original Latin, 
which tucks the word “iniuria” right after “pecudes.” That 
term does not have any literal translation that accounts for the 
issues that are raised, for the discussion then turns to the justi-
fication for killing in self-defense.19 There are of course other 
justifications, including discipline20 and assumption of risk in 
medical procedures that have to be added into the mix. There is 
nothing in the text that drives these issues to the fore or that 
indicates how they should be resolved. There are indeed some 
errors on points of detail, but the key lesson to take away from 
this one point is that it was well understood in early times that 
a sound system of interpretation requires the jurist to answer 
questions that the text raises without any specific guidance on 
how this should be done. 
The U.S. Constitution gives individuals certain rights against 
the government. It makes no references to the limitations on 
                                                                                                        
 19. DIG. 9.2.4 (Gaius, Ad Edictum Provinciale 7); id. at 9.2.5. (Ulpian, Ad Edic-
tum 18). 
 20. Id. at 9.2.5.3 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18). 
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those rights. Indeed, it does not have any term like “iniuria” to 
indicate how the question of justification might be resolved. Yet 
the logic of all rights works through the same system of pre-
sumptions found in the lex, so it should come as no surprise that 
there is an imperative structural need to take into account gov-
ernment justifications for limiting individual rights. In American 
constitutional law, this topic was customarily discussed under 
the police power, defined, nontextually, in the critical case of 
Lochner v. New York as providing health, safety, moral, and gen-
eral welfare reasons for restricting individual liberty.21 
It should be apparent that because the police power is not re-
ferred to by name in the Constitution, it has to be implied. To 
many people the process of implication is thought to be the 
opening of a wedge to a generalized theory of the living consti-
tution that knows no serious boundaries. But again this basic 
attitude is often taken out of historical context, for nothing is 
more common in, for example, the law of contract than the im-
plication of terms into standard agreement—terms that are so 
well attuned to the basic situation that they rarely need explicit 
attention even though they are in daily use. 
Here is a simple contract example: A agrees to sell B a widget 
for $4, and the question is whether or not this contract shall be 
regarded as indefinite as to its key terms and therefore unen-
forceable. A and B have not specified the sequence of the per-
formance between the two parties and there is in fact no parol 
evidence that could address that question, even if it were re-
garded as admissible. However, there are, as Justice Scalia re-
ferred to in connection with takings cases, certain sets of back-
ground principles,22 and the one that we use here in all cases is 
that essentially each party must tender either the cash or the 
widget, as the case may be, in order to be able to sue.23 By the 
same token, neither party has to perform in full before it can 
maintain an action against its trading partner.24 When the situa-
tion is presented to ordinary people, they commonly say some-
thing like “I’ve never thought about that.”  
                                                                                                        
 21. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
 22. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). 
 23. But see, e.g., Nichols v Raynbred, (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 238 (K.B.). 
 24. See id. 
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That comment should not be treated as an invitation to des-
pair. When ordinary people say they’ve never thought about it, 
they do not mean to say that it is wrong. What they mean is 
that the background norm of proper conduct is so strong that 
they have never had to think about it, because they always un-
derstood that that was an underlying principle of their behav-
ior. But once they do think about it, they realize that the stand-
ard rule makes good sense, if the effort is to maximize the joint 
welfare of the parties by minimizing what has aptly been called 
“credit risk.”25 The task in all cases is to figure out which se-
quence minimizes the sum of the default risks of the two par-
ties. The argument here only talks about the easiest case, and 
clearly as the fact patterns get more complex—for example, as 
simultaneous performance becomes impossible—the rules have 
to adapt, and the solutions become less reliable. But for these 
purposes, the key point is that there is no hesitation in taking 
the first step, where the good news is that the most common 
pattern is likely to yield a clear dominant solution. In harder 
cases, moreover, parties can tailor their own rules to govern 
their particular cases of sequential performance. 
It is easy to see how this process of implication works its way 
into constitutional discourse. To continue with the speech ex-
amples, it would be odd to insist that a person who yells “kill” 
when he attacks a stranger with a sword is engaged in protect-
ed speech under the Constitution, solely because he, like the 
mime, is engaged in a combination of speech and bodily acts. It 
is important to note the key difference between the two cases. 
In the former, the gesticulation is used to communicate ideas, 
but it does not carry with it the threat or use of force against its 
audience. In the latter case, the threat of force against that ad-
dressee is explicit in the speech and in the speaker’s action. Nor 
would the situation change if the assailant carried a sign that 
spoke of death to his intended target. Should freedom of 
speech or expression be read to say that anyone has the right to 
lie to anyone else, so as to direct them to a place which they 
think to be safe, but turns out to be a trap at which they will be 
killed? You could not do that under the Roman law principles. 
They were on to that game. Is government now allowed to un-
                                                                                                        
 25. Edwin W. Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 
903, 910 (1942). 
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dertake those repressive actions with impunity? So the inquiry 
turns to setting out principles that talk about the things that 
can be enjoined and those that cannot. The point here is not on-
ly true for speech, but for every other specific liberty protected 
by the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. All of these 
substantive guarantees have the same basic contours, so that 
the division one finds among the specific guarantees are often 
eclipsed by the commonality of the implied exceptions. 
There is good reason why judicial and scholarly discussions 
of police power pervade every nook and cranny of the constitu-
tion. Indeed, examples like these can be multiplied seemingly 
without limit, which explains why, at its root, interpretation, be 
it of the Constitution or of any other document, invites endless 
elaboration and explication. But that process is not without di-
rection of purpose. In the end, it is clear that the dominant jus-
tifications start with three: the control of force, the control of 
fraud, and the control of monopoly. Often other justifications 
are put forward, yet even then there is usually an attempt to 
link those justifications with one of these three categories. But it 
hardly follows that every purported police power justification 
has to be accepted by the courts. Many of these are so broad 
that if they were allowed to pass muster, the entire system of 
basic liberties would be consumed by the spurious exceptions 
to the basic principle.  
The point is critical because it helps explain the fatal turn in 
constitutional theory with the expansive New Deal definition 
of the police power. More concretely, it is incorrect to insist that 
a system of minimum price controls (which cannot be used to 
curb, but only to sustain, monopoly or cartel pricing) is intend-
ed to achieve any of these three objectives, when the primary 
motivation almost always has to do with efforts to disable 
competitors. Indeed, it is the police power that denies enforce-
ment under the antitrust law to private contracts in restraint of 
trade. The basic police power justification is stretched beyond 
its proper limits when legislatures seek to jam protectionist leg-
islation into the rubric of health and safety. 
One illustration is found in the key 1934 Supreme Court de-
cision Nebbia v. New York26, in which a challenged law made it a 
criminal offense to sell milk below its stated price. This looks 
                                                                                                        
 26. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
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like a straight case of protection against the “ruinous” competi-
tion that is characteristic of an industry with overcapacity, 
which describes the dairy industry perfectly. But the imagina-
tive effort to convert price regulations into safety regulations is 
ever-present, so the New York legislature concluded that the 
“[f]ailure of producers to receive a reasonable return for their 
labor and investment over an extended period threaten a relax-
ation of vigilance against contamination.”27 As a tribute of vice 
to virtue, an ounce of health and safety can drown out a pound 
of protectionist legislation. 
These examples are chosen to show how large political oaks 
grow out of small acorns, so long as these acorns are well tend-
ed. The Constitution protects the freedom of speech, but that 
guarantee cannot be read to say that all speech should operate 
free of any legal sanction. What it means is that protection is 
often withheld from those forms of speech that violate the lib-
ertarian norms against the use of force, fraud, and defamation. 
But by the same token, the organized dissent from government 
policies is protected against government regulation under the 
police power unless it relies on use of illegal threats or other, 
similar action. Further, qualifications are surely implicit in the 
basic enterprise to take into account such matters as burdens of 
proof and choice of remedy. But those matters only reinforce 
the basic point, which is that no textualist approach can survive 
without reference to some larger political theory that is evoked, 
but not explicitly referenced, in the disputed constitutional text. 
So at this juncture it is not possible to escape the conflict be-
tween the classical liberal and the modern progressive view. 
Indeed, it is important to formalize the difference. The classical 
liberal view notes that there are certain kinds of behavior that 
an organized society has to control, which brings us back to the 
matters of fraud, deception, and monopoly, all of which distort 
behavior away from the ideal of a competitive market model. It 
also embraces voluntary charitable and religious operations. 
The narrow account of the police power is the effort to recog-
nize that it is not all right to give people a choice between their 
money and their lives when they are entitled to both. Clearly 
the list of justifications for limiting speech is not confined to 
fraud cases. There are all sorts of matters associated with fair 
                                                                                                        
 27. Id. at 517. 
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trials, with national security, and with the publication of trade 
secrets that also fall within the scope of the police power as 
properly understood. These have to be developed topic by top-
ic, and always with reference to the underlying theory that an-
imates the basic provisions.  
There is one further key structural element that is critical to 
the task of constitutional interpretation, which stems from the 
simple fact that all governments have to do two things. First, 
They impose restraints on the actions of all those people, citi-
zens and others, who are subject to their power. In these cases, 
the strong presumption is that the government should justify 
the restriction that it imposes. But governments also act in a 
second role. They operate complex institutions—the courts, the 
prisons, the military, the schools, the roads, the highway sys-
tem, and many others. In these cases, the government acts not 
as a regulator but as the manager of its own activities. The 
great challenge in these cases is to formulate rules that give the 
government as manager sufficient discretion to discharge its 
functions without constant fear of litigation or recrimination 
whenever it makes a decision that in retrospect turns out to be 
wrong, or even debatable.  
 To meet this challenge, constitutional law must develop 
rules to deal with the role of both the legislative and executive 
branches, not only as a regulator of private conduct, but also as 
an operator of these critical public institutions. For this last set 
of cases, the appropriate analogies come from the law of gov-
ernment corporations, partnerships, and charitable organiza-
tions, all of which adopt some form of the business judgment 
rule, which, I believe, is usually more appropriate than the 
higher level scrutiny directed toward government regulation. 
That distinction, it must be stressed, does not come fully 
formed straight out of the constitutional text. Rather, the un-
derlying structural argument depends critically on an under-
standing of the need for a business judgment rule under corpo-
rate and partnership law that protects directors and officers 
(executive and legislative members) in the ordinary pursuit of 
their business. Yet different considerations arise in connection 
with the military, which occupies a distinctive niche and is out-
side the federal court system. The complications can go on. 
There is no shortcut of constitutional interpretation that al-
lows any court or analyst to skip over some of the many pro-
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posed police power claims raised in the wide range of contexts 
in which it arises. This inquiry falls on all parties who claim to 
fall in the originalist camp just as it falls on all parties who sub-
scribe to some version of the “living constitution.” It is no 
wonder that the major nineteenth century treatises treat the 
issue as one that deals with the various limitations on the gov-
ernment’s powers. Thomas Cooley’s great 1868 volume is 
called “ A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which Rest Up-
on the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union .” The 
phrase “police power”  works itself into the title of Christopher 
Tiedemann’s, A Treatise on the Police Power in the United States, 
published in 1886, and most famously into the title of Ernst 
Freund’s The Police Power and Constitutional Rights which came 
out in 1904. Clearly the implication of these powers does not 
depend on progressive theories of constitutional interpretation 
developed in the first third of the twentieth century. They are 
part and parcel of the basic structure of any constitutional dis-
course.  The distinctive change wrought by the progressives is 
that they added to the list of permissible justifications of the 
police power any effort to stifle what they termed “ruinous 
competition,” which covered the situation found in Nebbia as 
well as countless other cases regulating labor and agriculture.  
The transformation in constitutional orientation could not be 
more dramatic. The progressive view legitimates the protection 
of monopoly and cartel positions as a matter of constitutional 
law, something which the classical liberal judges were never 
prepared to do. By keeping the line strong, the classical liberal 
position tried to limit the police power to those actions that ad-
vanced social welfare, not those that degraded it. There is a 
constant effort on the part of the proponents of the modern po-
sition to allege that other and higher values account for the 
shift in position. But in the end it is not possible to identify 
these in any systematic way. The more expanded view of in-
terpretation, it must be stressed, does not lead to an open-
ended constitution in which anything goes. But it is not a huge 
leap in constitutional terms from the decisions of the 1930s to 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which was up-
held ultimately on a very broad account of the taxing power.28 
                                                                                                        
 28. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2584 (2012). 
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IV. REMEDIAL CHOICES 
The last of the great questions that arises to which there is no 
clear textualist answer concerns the choice of remedy in the 
event of a constitutional violation. For example, the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and sei-
zures does not indicate what should be done in the event of a 
violation.29 I have already mentioned in this context the tres-
pass action in Entick v. Carrington,30 which was a trespass action 
for damages. It turns out that in many cases the damages for 
trespass are minor, and the likelihood of repetition turns out to 
be small, so in these cases, the key question is whether that in-
formation that has been seized illegally should be excluded 
from evidence either by judicial oversight31 or constitutional 
command,32 at which point the only sensible answers can be 
reached by trading off the risks of wanton misbehavior of pub-
lic law enforcement agencies against the risk of allowing dan-
gerous criminals to return to the street. No one thinks that this 
is an easy choice, and much may depend on whether the police 
have acted in good or bad faith in conducting their activities; 
they are likely to get the nod in the former cases but not in the 
latter.33 The same kinds of choices arise with respect to all sorts 
of environmental wrongs, from common law nuisances, both 
public and private, to questions of global warming. These are 
the sorts of issues that ordinary courts have to face in dealing 
with the mix between equitable and damage remedies, both of 
which can be supplemented or displaced by statutory remedy. 
Here is not the place to solve any of these problems. It should 
suffice to note that the “coming to the nuisance” issue that has 
long vexed common law lawyers34 has its constitutional ana-
logue in Hadacheck v. Sebastian,35 which is to say that constitu-
tional interpretation requires that courts wade into the same 
remedial issues that are in evidence everywhere else in the law. 
                                                                                                        
 29. E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 30. (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P.). 
 31. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 32. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 
25 (1949)). 
 33. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984). 
 34. Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch.D 852. 
 35. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
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V. A LIVING CONSTITUTION? 
The basic task of constitutional interpretation, then, must of 
necessity go far beyond textualism in order, ironically, to be 
faithful to the text. But the question then arises whether the de-
vices at issue—which are needed to answer questions dealing 
with circumvention, justification, and remedy—open the door 
to deal with all manner of other questions. On balance I do not 
think that this is the case. To start with the private law, I have 
long defended a static conception of private law as the most 
accurate account of how it functions.36 That account is borne 
out by most tort issues, whose sound resolution takes place 
largely independent of time and location: issues of proximate 
cause, self-defense, consent, infancy, and the like receive more 
or less the same kind of treatment in the ancient texts as they 
do in the modern ones. Indeed, it is in fact the case that the lev-
el of variation of opinion that one finds within and across time 
and culture are about the same on hard questions as those that 
occur within any unitary system at any given time.37 It is just 
not that easy to decide whether coercion by a third person 
should count as a defense or the basis of an action for indemni-
ty or contribution against the third party. The answer to this 
question can come out any which way.38 The same point can be 
made about the “coming to the nuisance” issues referenced 
above. But what is equally clear is that the kinds of defenses 
that were not allowed within the early framework are not al-
lowed today either. No one can claim that his actions should 
not be subject to punishment because he acted with malice, or 
because he had a legitimate right to destroy the reputation of 
innocent parties. Of course there are technological advances of 
the sort that present new problems. There are many more ways 
to pollute a river today than there were in medieval times. But 
the basic logic of physical invasions applies as much to modern 
nuclear and chemical wastes as to old-fashioned animal matter. 
To be sure, the advent of new technologies, whether airplanes 
                                                                                                        
 36. See Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 253 (1980). 
 37. See generally Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-
Faith Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1987). 
 38. See, e.g., Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75 (1864) (allowing the defense); DIG. 
9.2.45.2 (Paul, Ad Sabinum 10). 
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or spectrum, can generate new types of properties, but these 
tend to follow on such key issues as exclusion, use, and aliena-
tion, the same basic parameters that are found in older forms of 
property rights. There is, moreover, a wide variety of water law 
systems, from riparianism, to reasonable use, to prior appro-
priation, which vary from location to location. But the choice 
among these systems is largely driven by a combination of the 
intensity of use and the high variation in the local topology of 
oceans, lakes, and rivers, so that the background principles by 
which these water rights are governed are largely independent 
of cultural or temporal differences. Indeed, on matters of feder-
al jurisdiction, it would be odd to say that there could be local 
commerce by horse and buggy, but that all commerce by city 
buses, cabs, and subways falls in interstate commerce. 
There is little question that this approach does not commend 
itself to most modern scholars of constitutional law in large 
measure because they tend to downplay the critical connection 
between private and public systems of right. But it is in practice 
a road to serious error to assume that one can figure out the 
public law governing contract, liberty, property, religion, and 
speech without having some deep understanding of how these 
propositions work in the private law. No short essay can put 
these together in one tidy bundle. But the examination of even 
a small set of the relevant issues points out the need for textual-
ism in a constitutional law system that starts with text but also 
builds out from it. 
 
